Sample

CHAPTER 1
Introduction

1.1 Human values

This book offers a firm foundation for human values. The values in question are values of personal morality such as honesty, values associated with our way of life such as friendship and aesthetic values such as beauty.
    Factual knowledge does not need a special foundation. It is well-supported by its success. Science is the leading example. The astonishing success of the natural sciences of physics, chemistry and biology in helping us to understand and manipulate the world is proof enough that what they tell us is mostly right, and very often useful. The social sciences and the humanities can also do pretty well. Economics tells us how to run markets efficiently, and historical explanations of events really do make sense of our past. But values have always seemed to lack that validation. If we say that something matters, that appears to be quite different from saying what it is like. Our values need a special type of foundation, an underlying ethic. But which ethic? Can we find an ethic so natural that acceptance of it is not a rash leap in the dark, but an obviously sensible step? This book offers an ethic that fits the bill, and shows in detail how the ethic does its job. I will show how value-based talk can lead us to conclusions that not merely have, but rightly have, just as much force for us as the conclusions of science.
    In the face of the contrast between the methods and progress of science and other factual disciplines, and the less glowing record of ethics, a tradition of non-cognitivism has flourished in ethics. Many philosophers have argued that ethical claims are neither true nor false. Some have argued that ethical claims express attitudes of approval or disapproval, while allowing that ethical disagreements involve differences in factual belief as well as differences in attitude (Stevenson, Ethics and Language). Others have argued that ethical claims are universal prescriptions, telling us how to conduct ourselves (Hare, The Language of Morals). Such approaches tend to make talk in terms of values appear to be second-rate as compared to talk in factual terms. More recent work has sought to give ethical claims a first-rate status as claims that we can justifiably take to be true or false, even if they do express attitudes (Blackburn, Ruling Passions). I propose a different approach to upholding the status of ethical claims, and the status of our value-laden discourse in general.
    We can see ourselves in two ways. From the outside, a human being is an object in the world, amenable to scientific study just like a star or an animal. From the inside, we experience our own lives quite differently. We are not objects but subjects, autonomous and responsible persons who steer our own courses through the world. We have our values, our histories and our plans for the future. We matter, and our world is a rich and meaningful one in which beauty and achievement are to be treasured. But there is a constant danger that those who favour the view from outside will persuade us that theirs is the only true view. For them, factual talk says everything that needs to be said. Our values and our aspirations are to be translated into our feelings of value and aspiration, and then perhaps into chemical and electrical states of our brains. If we allowed ourselves to be led down that path, the richness of our lives would evaporate. We would no longer be able to believe that life really had meaning or that values were to be taken seriously. Or if we did go on believing, we would secretly know that we were fooling ourselves, pretending that a feeling of meaning or value was the meaning or value itself.
    We do not need to go down that factual path, because we can easily support our values and talk in their terms. The foundation for our values is an ethic which says that it is good to pursue our projects. The ethic recognizes all that is finest about human life, because the pursuit of our projects requires the exercise of our talents. The ethic is a natural one, because it is in tune with our needs and is likely to promote our happiness. The ethic also gives us a reliable way to find meaning in our lives. And as we reflect on values in general, we will see how we have to arrive at the notion of an autonomous and responsible person. That notion is invisible to science, which can only see us as organisms, but our experience of our lives from the inside clearly tells us that we are autonomous and responsible.
    The foundation for values that I set out is independent of scientific or other factual knowledge. And it has two consequences. First, we can be confident that values built on this foundation are well-chosen and are not some random selection. The reason is that the choice of values will follow from an ethic which is exceptionally easy to defend, because of its naturalness. Second, if someone draws conclusions as to what to do on the basis of those values, those conclusions rightly have just as much force for her as the conclusions of a scientific or other factual argument. Conduct in accordance with those conclusions will then be justified.
    The proposed foundation for values is not a foundation for too wide a range of values. An ethic which says that it is good to pursue our projects is specific enough to favour values associated with the development of the individual, because individuals need to be allowed to devise and pursue their own projects. Correspondingly, the ethic is opposed to values that would justify the oppression of some people for the good of others, because the oppressed would not be able to pursue their own projects. However, the ethic is not so specific as to lead to a single definitive catalogue of values.
    A purely factual view of ourselves could account for someone\\’s belief that her values were soundly based and for the fact that her conclusions about what to do, based on her values, actually had great force for her. The structure of her brain, and the impact of her upbringing in a society in which certain values were widely respected, would give ample explanation. A purely factual view could also account for the evolution of certain values (Ridley, The Origins of Virtue). But my position is not that values can appear to be soundly based, or that value-based conclusions about what to do actually have force for people, or that there are explanations for why we have the values that we do have. My position is that values founded on the ethic really are soundly based, and that it is right for corresponding conclusions about what to do to have force for us. This rightness means that if someone does conduct herself in accordance with values that the ethic supports, that provides justification for her conduct. She, from her point of view, is right to see that justification as sufficient. This is so, even though other people may object to what she does because of adverse consequences and may be justified in stopping her.
    The search for a foundation for our values is not motivated by a fear that without it we would lose faith in our values, or that we would become unable to appreciate goodness or beauty. We clearly would not do so, at least not in the short term. Rather, the search is motivated by a desire to show that when we do reflect on the foundations of our values, there are answers which support our values. We do not need to reflect on the foundations of our values at all. But as Socrates indicated, the examination of our lives is worth the effort (Plato, Apology, 38a).

1.2 The foundation

The foundation for values that I put forward is an ethic which says that the pursuit of human projects is a central element in the good life. That ethic confers merit on the pursuit of our projects. (When there is merit in the pursuit of a project, I will refer to it as a meritorious project.) That merit in turn supports the values which help us to pursue our projects with a reasonable prospect of success, such as values of respect and honesty.
    Each of us is committed to a range of projects, to varying degrees. At one extreme are projects that we undertake with little or no internal debate, and often without even articulating them as projects, such as the projects of getting adequate food and shelter. At the other extreme are projects that are entirely optional, and chosen after careful consideration, but to which we can still be very committed. An example would be the project of qualifying as a doctor. In between there are projects, great and small, which we undertake every day and which structure our lives, including projects to bring up children, to develop friendships and to complete tasks at work. Many of these, like some fundamental projects, will not be consciously chosen or even articulated as projects.
    Much of what we do can be described in terms of projects, but this does not mean that all the things we do are on the same level. In particular, some projects are much more demanding than others and some projects achieve much more than others. This will matter in chapter 12, when we turn to the details of the ethic. There will be scope to rank the more demanding projects, and those that achieve more, above other projects. Another theme will be the importance of one person\\’s projects not interfering with another person\\’s projects. A rule that we should not tread on each other\\’s toes will follow naturally from the ethic of projects.
    Many of the values that are to be supported are captured in concepts that explicitly embody those values, such as honesty and friendship. But everyday concepts such as the concept of a job or the concept of the family, which carry with them implications as to what we should do, also capture values. I shall refer to all of these concepts as guiding concepts, because we let them guide our lives, and I shall speak of concepts being used as guides. The guiding concepts may guide us directly, by inclining us to certain conduct. Thus the guiding concept of friendship inclines us to be kind to our friends. But guiding concepts can also imply specific rules of conduct. The guiding concept of honesty implies a rule that we should not tell lies. Many of our guiding concepts could equally well be called values. But I will speak in terms of guiding concepts because there are guiding concepts that we would not normally call values, or even think of as value-laden. The concept of gravity, for example, guides our lives by encouraging us to be careful when climbing trees. The concept of gravity enters into our deliberations about what to do, just as much as the concept of honesty enters into those deliberations.
    Projects will support values in the following way. The merit of pursuing our projects will imply that the guiding concepts which correspond to values should steer our lives, if that would help us to pursue our projects successfully. The merit will usually have that implication because if we are steered by a given guiding concept, that will facilitate the pursuit of projects in general. Honesty, for example, greatly facilitates the pursuit of all manner of projects. This argument is set out in sections 7.3 and 7.4. Where a guiding concept does not facilitate the pursuit of projects in general, the merit of the pursuit of projects will support the use of a guiding concept because the concept\\’s use will facilitate the pursuit of specific projects that have been chosen. Thus use of the guiding concept of beauty facilitates the pursuit of projects to create beautiful things. In this way, the ethic will support guiding concepts that have no direct connection with the pursuit of projects in general, but only with the pursuit of a narrow range of projects. This argument is set out in section 12.4.
    Suppose that a guiding concept is supported by an acceptable ethic, such as the ethic of projects. Then conclusions as to what to do, and conduct in accordance with those conclusions, will be justified if they are based on that guiding concept. Thus someone who was guided by the concept of friendship might help a friend. If she was challenged to justify what she did, she would simply say that the person she helped was her friend. That would be all the justification that was needed. The argument “he is my friend, so I should help him” would be perfectly valid for her. She would believe that no extra premises were needed. And so long as the guiding concept of friendship derived support from an acceptable ethic, she would be right to believe that her argument was complete.

The structure of the book

Chapter 2 explores the notion of a guiding concept, and covers some issues surrounding the ways in which guiding concepts steer us. Then chapters 3 to 6 set out what it is to have a set of guiding concepts, and cover the implications for our views of the world and of ourselves. While these chapters delay engagement with the main argument, they are an essential preliminary. We need to understand what it is that meritorious projects support, before we can see how they do it. These chapters also offer a way of thinking about the relationship between scientific and more subjective views of the world. And they set out a conception of the human subject that will allow the argument to proceed. Chapters 7 to 10 cover meritorious projects, the support that they give to some guiding concepts and the role of projects in defining ourselves. Finally, chapters 11 and 12 show how the ethic of projects lends merit to the pursuit of our projects. This step has to come at the end because we need to understand the concept of a meritorious project thoroughly, before we can grasp the full content of an ethic that advocates the pursuit of projects.
    Although the argument digs downwards to the ethic as the source of support, rather than starting with the ethic and building upwards, I will show at each stage how the support that is given is in fact support for what has been covered at the previous stage. Although the sequence of the argument is from guiding concepts to meritorious projects to the ethic, meritorious projects will be shown to be sufficient support for guiding concepts and the ethic will be shown to be sufficient support for meritorious projects. So if the argument were set out in the reverse order, building upwards from the ethic, we would still end up with guiding concepts.
    I will get value into a view of the world quite explicitly, by adopting the ethic that attaches merit to the pursuit of our projects. While I will argue that the ethic is appealing, it will not be a logical consequence of some other premises that do not themselves involve values. I do not claim to be able to deduce values from a purely factual view of the world. A popular philosophical slogan is that you cannot get an ought from an is. This means that facts do not on their own imply values. (The slogan was inspired by David Hume\\’s Treatise of Human Nature, book 3, part 1, section 1, page 469, although Hume did not give the slogan in its modern form.) I do not refute the slogan. Instead, my introduction of value will be motivated by the fact that it allows us to buy precious results at a low price. Adoption of the ethic is a modest and natural thing to do, but it provides a base on which a great deal can be built. This book analyses the structure of what can be built on it, and shows how the building can be done.

View Synopsis View Information Purchase Options