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CHAPTER 1:  INTRODUCTION

In my Foreword, I defined the difference between knowledge and belief as reality-evaluation.  I now describe the process by which we convert belief to knowledge or otherwise stop at belief.  My contention is that the external world interacts with our senses to stimulate our imagination to create belief as to the stimuli; that this becomes knowledge only when reality-evaluated for consistencywith other stimuli; that even when knowledge stimulates imaginative belief, further knowledge requires further reality-evaluation; that rationality is the linkage whether the process stops at belief or completes to knowledge; and that without this rationality we could not share belief or knowledge in conversation or act cooperatively on either.  Thus, the complete process is the Rational Trinity and its non-completion is the Rational Duality. 
     Thus, the tool-making of our hominid ancestors and our subsequent development of craftsmanship, science and technology are products of the Trinity, religion and philosophy are products of the Duality, and our traditional behaviour-codes, ethics, literature and political philosophy are undifferentiated mixtures of both, with imagination being the source of all.  Thus, I compare the respective products of knowledge and belief to clarify their differentiation and I maintain this clarification by avoiding all common-speech ‘synonyms’ for ‘knowledge’ and ‘belief’.  In addition, my differentiation in terms of the completeness or incompleteness of a single rational process shows that both knowledge and belief are rational, that preferment of belief over knowledge is nonetheless mistaken, and that adherence to reality-refuted belief is the reality-rejection of madness. 
     Thus, not all beliefs can be transposed to positive or negative knowledge by reality-evaluation.  Accordingly, I allocate to Category A, the purposeful beliefs (hypotheses) which on reality-evaluation produce the knowledge which is craftsmanship, science and technology together with proto-knowledge defined as belief unrecognised as knowledge though in conformity with commonsense; to Category B, beliefs which are inaccessible to reality-evaluation either in principle or pro tem; and to Category C, those which persist despite reality-refutation.  Further to Category A, I define the Ur-belief in knowledge as that which believes ourselves and our surroundings to be knowable and which gives rise to the hypotheses of Category A while itself remaining suspended belief.  Again, as to Category B, I define the Ur-belief of religion as our unformulated awareness of the Unknowable, the specific derivatives of which can only  be accepted, rejected or suspended, or if touching on the reality of human nature can be submitted to reality-evaluation as hypotheses of Category A or to Category C as already reality-refuted; and the Ur-belief in rationality which must itself be rejected as believing knowledge to be available without reality-evaluation, though its derivatives may be submitted to reality-evaluation as hypotheses of Category A or to Category C as reality-refuted, while rationality develops mathematics from reality-validated axioms.
     On this basis, my reviews of the Rational Trinity in action on Category A beliefs show that it produced not only the knowledge which is craftsmanship, science and technology, but also the self-knowledge of human nature which is the knowledge component of traditional behaviour codes, ethics, literature and political philosophy.  Thus, I show that this knowledge of human nature arose from having to reconcile our innate selfishness with our innate interdependence as required for our survival and social cohesion as a group-species; that derivatives of the religious Ur-belief itself are reflections of this self-knowledge as confirmed by their ability to provide emotional support and to inspire motivate and encourage compliance with the required behaviour; and that such knowledge is accepted as belief by the religious and rejected as such by the anti-religious in a joint failure to accept reality as its source.  Again, these reviews show that our concepts of good and bad and of right and wrong reflect knowledge of what works or not in craftsmanship and of what is beneficial or not to our collective survival; and that our conscience and sense of fairness express our innate acceptance of responsibility for this survival.
     Nonetheless, my reviews of philosophy and religionshow that the non- and anti-religious  now rely on the rational Ur-belief in substituting their own beliefs for the self-knowledge component (empiricism) of traditional behaviour codes, ethics and political philosophy; that these secular beliefs should have been submitted to reality-evaluation as Category A hypotheses to confirm or develop our self-knowledge; and that in moulding social policy to these beliefs without reality-evaluation, secularists have shown themselves not only anti-religious but also anti-knowledge in their retention of beliefs consignable to Category C by their failure on implementation as social policy. 
     However, I show that this self-knowledge guides analysis of literary and dramatic works for the Truth of their content as judged by their capacity to inspire, motivate and encourage and by their capacity to provide emotional satisfaction through their artistry; that religious texts and dramatic ceremonials are not analysed in this way; and that denial of the self-knowledge of religion perpetuates the belief-based debate between the secular and religious despite its being resolvable by knowledge recognition and agreement to accept, reject or suspend belief.  Thus, I show that both humanist and religious texts are mixtures of self-knowledge and belief, no matter how much the contestants respectively deny it; that the knowledge-content of religion relieves loneliness and improves behaviour, even when belief is suspended; that secularism bereft of this knowledge does neither, even when its beliefs are accepted; and that the belief-driven conflicts of both religion and secularism are equally bloodthirsty in their irrationality. 
     As to rejection of the Ur-belief in rationality as a source of knowledge, my reviews of craftsmanship, science and philosophy from the Dark Age to 1800 show that philosophers who had failed to recognise the reality-evaluation implicit in craftsmanship’s use of reality, now failed to recognise it in the scientific method of experimentation which had begun to investigate the nature of reality.  Thus, while reality-evaluation by direct observation had been the unconscious sine qua non of craftsmanship over millennia and while some in the Renaissance had welcomed experimentation, Enlightenment humanists maintained their mistaken reliance on rationality.  Thus, whether failure to recognise reality-evaluation as the only means of transforming belief (philosophy) to knowledge (science) was due to ignorance or self-interest, I show that philosophy remained stalled on the Rational Duality, and that association of the term ‘enlightenment’ with eighteenth century secular humanism was mistaken then and since.  However, as to progress by the Rational Trinity, my review of craftsmanship, science, technology and philosophy from the eighteenth century to the present day shows that science for its own sake went from strength to strength, transformed craftsmanship to self-supporting technology and brought about the abandonment of philosophy as a knowledge-source, though not as a source of belief.  Indeed, scientists are as attracted to belief as anyone when in socio-political mode and especially when seeking public funds. 
     However, professional exponents of the Duality being incapable of any knowledge-based progress, began to categorise the humanities and science as distinct cultures, the former being civilising, liberalising and humanising and the latter de-humanising, illiberal and war-mongering.  Now, while some such self-justification was to be expected, I show that the true dichotomy is belief and knowledge, not art and science; and that science, technology, craft and art are sub-divisions of the knowledge continuum within which disputes, let alone wars do not arise.  In addition, my reviews of religion and of the separate branches of philosophy show that consensus of belief is at best only a temporary stabilisation in an otherwise perpetual ferment with socio-political implementation of such consensual stabilisations being the source of the ills mistakenly attributed to science; and that even when differences in belief are peacefully containable within public debate, the ballot-box never provides conclusive stabilisation, reality-evaluation being absent from socio-politics.  Indeed, stabilisations achieved by violence are only temporary, though they may be prolonged by further violence or its threat.     
     Thus, my review of social-political systems shows that while differences in belief can cause internal violence, knowledge brings peaceful resolution; and that while belief-based debate cannot avoid warfare over territory and resources relating to survival, all such can be aggravated by differences in cultural and religious beliefs quite unrelated to reality.  Thus, I show that internal differences in belief destroyed the Roman Empire while inter-group differences perpetuated violence through the ensuing Dark Age, the religious wars of the counter-Reformation and all secular revolutions and wars thereafter; and that conflict resolution has always required knowledge-based action or direct contact with reality in the end.  Thus, I show that whether belief or avarice be the cause, differentiation of knowledge from belief and preference for the former reduces the scope for conflict in all such cases; and that while physical force can be unavoidable, knowledge-based negotiation is more successful than its belief-based alternative. 
     As to whether there need ever be conflict between knowledge and belief, I show that none need arise between knowledge and category A beliefs (hypotheses), these being destined to become knowledge by reality-evaluation. Nor can conflict rationally arise between knowledge and category C beliefs, these having already been reality-refuted.  Again, as to the religious Ur-belief of category B, there should be no dispute with knowledge let alone life-or-death conflict, such belief and its derivatives being beyond reality-evaluation in principle.  Furthermore, with respect to derivatives of the religious Ur-belief and secular interpretations of the rational Ur-belief which touch on reality, my sub-division into belief category A (for reality-evaluation), category B (pending possible hypothesis formulation) and category C (already reality-refuted) can rationally prevent conflict with knowledge in every case.  Thus, I show that such derivative beliefs, having no intrinsic value other than as hypotheses with respect to reality, provide no grounds for conflict with knowledge, and that believers have so far avoided this no-contest defeat by knowledge only because belief and knowledge have not been differentiated in my terms.  Indeed, I show that religious and secular believers maintain a semblance of consequence for their respective beliefs only through their on-going struggle for control of human behaviour irrespective of our need for knowledge-based social cohesion; and that it is this mutually supportive obfuscation alone which avoids confrontation with knowledge and inevitable defeat for reality-refuted belief.
     Thus, I show that conflict is not between belief and knowledge: it is between belief and belief.  Again, as to claims that secular (belief-based) proposals for social improvement are opposed by religious belief in continuance of its earlier opposition to knowledge, I show that secular belief is not knowledge; that craft- knowledge has been acceptable to religious belief since time immemorial; that while prayer and sacrifice were believed to influence crop yield, they were never believed to be substitutes for the sowing of seed, survival related knowledge trumping belief in agriculture as it had in the maintenance of group cohesion.  Again, in classical times, craft knowledge was accepted without question while the speculations of natural philosophy were co-extensive with religion, speculators and believers accepting or rejecting speculations as they did beliefs.  Indeed, my review of early Christianity shows that orthodoxy opposed speculation as it did heresy while craftsmanship developed unmolested through the Dark Age.  Again, craftsmanship and natural philosophy were accepted by Islam until speculation conflicted with orthodoxy.  Later, it was speculation with some undifferentiated (craft-like) knowledge of reality which might have been rejected had Thomas Aquinas not argued for its acceptance, while in any case, craftsmanship progressed to the end of the seventeenth century without knowing anything about the underlying nature of its materials and processes.  Thus, I show that knowledge was rarely if ever opposed by the religious; that speculation was opposed as is one belief by another; that Christians became as tolerant of scientific knowledge as they had been of craft knowledge; and that the more pressing issue now is whether secular belief can tolerate knowledge in the socio-political sphere other than as a misapplied weapon against religion.
     In fact, my reviews from the Renaissance onwards show that the possibility of dispute between Christian belief and knowledge evaporated into peaceful coexistence, this being particularly so with the Reformed Churches in which belief in a one-to-one relationship between the self and God, permitted more freedom in general.  However, this religious freedom with its interest in self-improvement led to secular socio-political systems as shown by my review of developments in political philosophy from the sixteenth century to the present day.  However, coexistence of scientific knowledge with religious belief was entirely possible.  Thus, whether believing themselves to be revealing the mysteries of God’s creation or whether indifferent to religious belief, there is little evidence of active campaigning against religion by scientists.  On the other hand, I show that secularists used rationality/irrationality as a surrogate for secular/religious in promoting belief-based socio-political change; that rather than differentiating belief from knowledge, they conflated their rationality with knowledge to decry as irrational the knowledge-based codes of religion; and that in doing so they exhibited more desire to destroy religion than did any scientist other than Darwinists then and since, though their campaign is one of belief against belief. 
     Thus, I show that in touting rationality to discredit religion, the secular produced no new knowledge,  though they did produce belief spectra as irresolvable as the heresy spectra with which orthodoxy had contended, reality-evaluation being shunned by believers as damaging to their respective beliefs.  Indeed, so prevalent and multifarious is secular socio-political belief today that it is scarcely possible to identify a knowledge-based policy implementation to compare its success with the plethora of belief-based failures, none of which are accepted as a reality-refutation of belief or an opportunity to implement a knowledge-based alternative.  Thus, while voter apathy is attributed to loss of trust in the personal probity of politicians, I show that unfulfilled promises, the persistence of inconclusive debate and the rejection of commonsense are the more likely causes; and that while voters have yet to articulate their disquiet in terms of knowledge differentiated from belief, replacement of the latter by the former would transform failure to success and voter apathy to enthusiasm.
     Meanwhile, uncritical acceptance of secular belief permits one interpretation to defend another without limit while reality is rejected.  Thus, knowledge-based behaviour codes have been set aside by optimistic juggling of beliefs in equality, freedom and rights, while Utopia’s absence is attributed to the continuing presence of the religious authoritarianism mistakenly believed to have opposed ‘rationality’ all along.  However, having shown this to be a fallacy, I also show that secular authoritarianism has no vestige of reality-evaluation; that its preference for belief over knowledge is irrational; that it treats its ‘self-evident truths’ as justifying suppression of counter-evidence and citation of partial supporting evidence where it deems such necessary to convince an otherwise sceptical public; that the ambience of belief thus created turns social-science to pseudo-science detrimental to social welfare, and physicochemical science from knowledge-based concern for environment, recycling, health and safety to belief-based counter-productive alternatives to the detriment of physical welfare; and that all such misdirection could have been avoided had knowledge been differentiated from belief in what would then have been a real Enlightenment.
     Thus, I show that those who believe technology to be heading for environmental disaster have no more regard for reality-evaluation than those who seek a belief-based social Utopia; that current interpretations of beliefs in equality, freedom and rights lack the reality-validation (empiricism) without which no socio-political system can be justified; that other arbitrary interpretations of these same beliefs have already led to dictatorships and to the most damaging conflicts in human history; that such arbitrariness of interpretation is the unrecognised source of national and international conflict; that secular beliefs are now a greater barrier to socio-political progress than religious beliefs ever were, the behaviour codes of the latter having a knowledge-content lacking in the former; and that reversal of the current preference for belief over knowledge requires the voting public to rely on its commonsense in insisting on policy failures being recognised as reality-refutations of belief, and in calling for knowledge-based alternatives. 
     As to the likelihood of this reversal being achieved by commonsense, I show that our innate Rational Trinity interacts with our surroundings from birth to provide the knowledge necessary for our immediate and early survival; that this process is subconscious before it is conscious as with all species within their species-specific limits; and that it has been operative since the inception of Homo sapiens as the basis of our inadvertent copying of our elders, of our trial and error learning and of our absorption of knowledge during upbringing and general education.  Thus, commonsense is what we have innately learnt as a species and with others in our culture as non-specialist experiential knowledge for use and augmentation in all new situations including the acquisition of specialist knowledge.  Thus, the latter is a further manifestation of the commonsense which secured our natural survival in the first place through our innate differentiation of good from bad, right from wrong and success from failure by reference to reality.  Again, while we sometimes have to act on incomplete knowledge, on a mixture of knowledge and belief, or on belief alone, with mistakes being thus made at individual, national and international levels, we should recall that our individual commonsense is supplemented by that of our species as preserved in the knowledge-content of our behaviour-codes, cultural practices and historical records; that in relying on these we are relying as we would on a wise and experienced friend; and that commonsense should thus be adequate to differentiate knowledge from belief by noting the presence or absence of reality-evaluation.
     Thus, with this expansion of my Foreword, I have introduced my history of science as a subset of knowledge contrasted with belief, the objective of which is to engage commonsense in changing belief-based democracy to knowledge-based democracy to avoid its destruction by rejected-reality, this Change being overdue, imperative and possible for the first time, knowledge having now been differentiated from belief and science from pseudo-science as defined and exemplified herein. 

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